This is a chart of the countries, capitals, and leaders.
Let me know if it is WRONG.
http://www.uky.edu/%7Epmmu222/comps/MidEastrulers.docx
Also a map with capitals.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/articlePictures/Middle-East-map.gif
Monday, October 26, 2009
Sunday, October 18, 2009
Posted more docs to the webpage
http://www.uky.edu/~pmmu222/comps/
Just email me a file if you want it posted.
Just email me a file if you want it posted.
Israel map showing expansion
Some say this map is kind of biased, but it gives the different borders at different stages for Israel.
National Security comps notes
National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol –
- when does enhanced security bring diminishing returns?
o You can keep making the country safer and safer, but each extra security measure costs something, requires people to give up something
o Preventing spread of communism – how much was it worth during the Cold War? Make people free even if it means destroying cities and people?
- Security dilemma – building up armaments to make your self more secure appears as a threat to another country… vicious cycle, more prone to war?
Overused terms – “national interest” and “national security”
- people have conflicting ideas about what is the “national interest”
o some argue Afghanistan is in our national interest, opposite side argue that it is against our national interest to be involved
o important: both sides believe they are doing what is in the best “interest”, but different values are behind each argument
o national interests need to be very specific about common values
Territorial integrity, physical security, economic well being, internal and external democracy
• Territorial integrity not as pressing a concern for US like India and Pakistan
Values are always in flux and are subject to debate over time
- National Security
o Security is about protection of previously acquired values
o Security is never absolute, we can never secure a value 100% against all eventualities
o There are multiple roads to security, each with its own positives and drawbacks
Some argue that acting with the UN is part of national security while others argue that we lose security by sacrificing sovereignty
o Securing our values means giving up some of those values
Value trade offs are inevitable
When you pay money to build more planes, you are taking money you might give back to the citizens or by poured into a government program
o Security conversations do not exists in a vacuum, they touch on every other element of the national conversation
What values are we actually securing when we act in national security?
- Review of Thor Meets Captain America
o Main point: American superheroes were greater than the Norse gods and could have been used to fight, but that was un-American. The Allies would rather have lost than acted like that. Also, the Nazis surrendered all relevance and power to the Norse gods by recruiting them to fight
- Wars of Choice and Wars of Necessity
o Supporters of war declare necessity opponents decry choice
o No such thing as a war of necessity, except insofar as it is necessary to the protection of specific values, but recall that those values are themselves contingent, there are always other options
o A War of Choice may nonetheless be a good idea
A war of necessity is not the only good war
o Discussions about initiating war and about the conduct of war are inherently political
Architecture, Policy and Process
• Architecture of the U.S. national security state is made of a structure of “organs,” each with their own mission
Ex. CIA, NSA, State Department
1947 – a dramatic shift in American policy and architecture after WWII to fit America’s hegemonic role
National Security Act (1947) – restructuring of national security state; Departments of War and Navy merged to create the Department of Defense; also created the CIA and NSC
U.S. policy reoriented to focus on the containment of the Soviet Union
Important Issue: There has been no similar reconstruction of the security institutions since the end of the Cold War. However, the tasks of the organs have changed to combat terrorism and institutions are now working with one another
o Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
Military command was centralized under a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Unified Combatant Commands - brought together the different services, such as the Army and Air Force, to accomplish the tasks needed in a specific area
The newest institution is the Department of Homeland Security (2002) which tries to pull together the bureaucracies to defend the U.S. against terrorism; DNI also created to streamline intelligence (2004)
Security institutions are still looking for someone to confront and contain
In 2000, the Department of Defense was looking for the rise of China to replace the Soviet Union
• Policy and Process:
National Security Council is President’s principle forum on national security – it considers policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies concerning national security
National Security Advisor is responsible to give the President all policy options and oversee interagency operations
Key Departments and Agencies in the National Security Policy Process
Department of State: Leads interagency coordination in developing and implementing foreign policy
Department of Defense: Possible use of military forces and expenditure of DoD resources
Intelligence Community: Provide information for policy-makers to help understand elements and dynamics of various situations
Department of Homeland Security: Protects American interests internally against terrorist threats; ensures polices for HS reflect national security interests
o U.S. National Security Policy is manageable because it has a limited number of players:
State, Defense, Intel, and NSC
• Helpful Reading:
• “National Security Policy Process,” Whittaker, Smith, and McKune
o http://www.virginia.edu/cnsl/pdf/NSC-Report-2007.pdf
• NSC – 68
• The Truman Doctrine
• National Security Policy – Coercion, Force, Deterrence Notes
PRIMACY
Primacy
• Essentially, collective goods are under-provided unless single or small group of actors pick up the slack
• In international politics, even small groups have a hard time getting along, meaning that only one hegemon can provide collective goods (trade regulation, lender of last resort, provision of common currency & security provider)
• In absence of single hegemon, the world suffers economically
American Unipolarity
• US has essentially been hegemonic power since 1945
• 24% of economic production
• Technological primacy, desirable ideology, language and culture
How Does Primacy End?
• Balancing coalition- several collude to displace premier power
• Imperial overstretch
• Uneven growth rates based on economic maturity. Prime state has most mature economy which limits growth
• Voluntary withdrawal
How desirable is primacy?
• It’s freakin’ expensive. Hegemon spends more on defense than everyone else.
• Power remains limited
• Generally speaking, hegemony is desirable. Opens up benefits, allows latitude of action and you can design the system to suit yourself.
The President and Congress
1. The Constitution
- designates President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces with a latitude of decision making power in foreign affairs including management of the State Dept.
- gives Congress the power of the purse, the power to declare war, authorize treaties and some checks on presidential appointments and presidential behavior
- leaves much up for interpretation and tradition
2. Actual Congressional Power
• much congressional power is informal and dependent on the personal interests of particular individuals
• the Executive makes foreign policy in collusion with Congress through different avenues of collaboration
• congressional oversight tends to limit the power of the Executive through formal investigations and the needs of informal deal-making
• the power of the purse is used rarely and is complicated
• no war has been declared since WWII despite multiple conflicts since then
3. Vietnam and the War Powers Act
• after Korea, Vietnam and Watergate it was perceived that the Executive had overstepped its authority
• War Powers Act of 1973 was designated to limit the ability of the President to carry forward undeclared wars and to provide for additional congressional oversight
• War Powers Act has generally been rejected by the Executive as unconstitutional; courts have been silent, but favor the Executive on foreign policy questions
4. Cheney and Executive Power
• after 9/11, Congress authorized military action against the Taliban and terrorism generally
• the authorization was interpreted by many within the Bush administration as a blanket authorization for virtually any foreign policy activity the President sees fit to execute
• it has been argued, the President has the authority to renounce or reinterpret any treaty, to interpret habeas corpus requirements as narrowly as necessary and to define terms like “torture” and “unlawful combatant” beyond the constraint of Congress
• the return to divided government in 2007 brought additional scrutiny on the executive branch activities, but no transformation
DETERRENCE ETC.
• Deterrence Theory
o Developed from game theory in the 50’s.
o Threat of nuclear war in particular drives concern with deterrence
o Rational choice model
Interest is defined as expected utility, taking into account costs, benefits, likelihood of success, and the value of alternative options; this means that a state expecting to lose can still initiate a war (Ex: Japan 1941 – downside of not going to war was too costly).
o In order to deter an opponent, you must convince the opponent that you can increase his costs such that aggression will have no benefit; states only go to war when it is in their interests
o A deterrent posture involves both capabilities (ability to inflict costs) and resolve (willingness to pay the price of inflicting costs)
o Extended deterrence: Bringing the umbrella of deterrence over a friendly state; inherently less credible than normal deterrence (ex. We will stand beside Israel)
o Can apply to both conventional and nuclear war
• How is War Rational at All?
o Why do wars happen between rational actors? Why aren’t negotiated settlements available?
o First, states have an incentive to misrepresent their capabilities – secret capabilities increase the chance of victory in war
o Second, under anarchy, some commitment can’t be firmly held; agreements are not binding and there is no central arbiter
o Third, some goods may be indivisible (two states cannot rule Jerusalem simultaneously)
o Note that this is simply a theoretical exercise, assuming that states are unitary rational actors
o Implications: What does it tell us when one state is flaunting its capabilities? What does it tell us when a state conceals its capabilities?
Think about Saddam’s incentive to claim he had chemical weapons so he could win his war with Iran – US believed him.
Fear the states that conceal – they don’t want you to know what they have - expectation of conflict is high
• Security Dilemma
o We can try to avoid war by increasing our capabilities and thus deterring potential opponents
o However, by increasing our security, we decrease the security of others
o The seizure of strategic territories of the building of armaments that serve to protect us, threaten others
o Even purely “defensive” measures such as walls or missile shields can be turned on an enemy and thus threaten her security
o Status quo states become suspicious of one another, and can become involved in hostility spirals that result in arms races or even war
Example: construction of German High Seas Fleet (to defend against a possible British attack if we take France and Russia)
Example: The construction of the Wall of Athens
Example: The construction of a missile defense shield.
• Critiques of Deterrence Theory
o Psychological – assumes rational actors, value own survival, suffer motivated bias (believing that what we want to be true is actually true), and confirmation bias (new information is interpreted as confirming preexisting beliefs). Difficulties in assessing will and resolve. In times of crisis, there are cognitive roadblocks that may prevent rational action.
o Bureaucratic – bureaucracies survive by regularizing procedure, In crisis, orgs. act procedurally rather than rationally. Also, bureaucracies have different interests than states as a whole.
o Values – deterrence theory assumes that states share a set of basic value understandings (survival, maximization of power, etc) which may in fact be alien to particular value systems
• Terrorism
o Conventional international relations theory is not well equipped for the problem of terrorism. The rational unitary actor assumption generally applies to states
o New security dilemma: as states attempt to create order through traditional means, they succeed in creating more disorder
o Recognition of the contingency of the nation-state; one actor among many
o Emphasis on how deterrence works against non-governmental organizations
o Deterrence theory can still apply; such organizations continue to have values, and values can be threatened.
IE don’t blow yourself up in Israel or we’ll bulldoze your house/family and your neighbor’s house/family
Making terrorism harder can be a deterrent – sure they’re willing to die, but maybe not die for nothing (if we put up a fence they can’t get over)
They have costs, and the costs can be raised. They have values, and their values can be threatened.
• Selected quotes from Thomas Schelling’s Arms and Influence
o “With enough military force a country may not need to bargain. Some things a country wants it can take, and some things it has it can keep, by sheer strength, skill and ingenuity.” – 1
o “…brute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve. It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply.” – 3
o “It is when his pain gives us little or no satisfaction compared with what he can do for us, and the action or inaction that satisfies us costs him less than the pain we can cause, that there is room for coercion.” – 4
o “To hunt down the Comanches and to exterminate them was brute force; to raid their villages to make them behave was coercive diplomacy, based on the power to hurt.” – 5
o “And one of his associates said, ‘Sherman is perfectly right… The only possible way to end this unhappy and dreadful conflict… is to make it terrible beyond endurance.’” – 15
o “The political target of the bomb was not the dead of Hiroshima or the factories they worked in, but the survivors in Tokyo. The two bombs were in the tradition of Sheridan against the Comanches and Sherman in Georgia.” – 17
o “Against defenseless people there is not much that nuclear weapons can do that cannot be done with an ice pick.” – 19
o “This is a difference between nuclear weapons and bayonets. It is not in the number of people they can eventually kill, but in the speed with which it can be done, in the centralization of decision, in the divorce of the war from political processes, and in computerized programs that threaten to take the war out of human hands once it begins.” – 20
o “At law there is a doctrine of the ‘last clear chance.’ It recognizes that, in the events leading up to an accident, there was some point prior to which either party could avert collision, some point after which neither could, and very likely a period between when one party could still control events but the other was helpless to turn aside or stop.” – 44
o (Quoting Sun Tzu – “When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.” 45, notes)
• Compellence (vs. Deterrence)
o An action intended to convince some adversary to take an action, rather than desist from some action.
Coercion – action intended to hurt until the enemy gives up
To hurt, we must know what the enemy values
Compellent power comes from what we haven’t destroyed and our capability to destroy it – not what we have destroyed.
Almost all violence we see in the world is coercion, not brute force.
The last thing you want is a country that has nothing left to lose
• Credibility
o Must make others believe our threats and promises
o Automatic mechanisms – tripwires and alliances are designed to convey commitment
o Bringing the crazy: indicating to the other side that you will pay costs beyond the rational to get what you want
o Interdependence of commitment: An indication of low resolve in one situation indicates low resolve in others situations, thus damaging your credibility – injured reputation for resolve everywhere -
o Bargaining reputation: something worth fighting for? Go to war to maintain reputation? Some people think so.
o Rationality – destroying the world is automatically irrational, so Mutually Assured Destruction is irrational.
• Sending Messages
o Must speak the same language as our opponent – must be able to understand our message
o So use of violence is subject to the same difficulties as the use of diplomacy
o Incentive to deceive – bluffing versus credible commitment, etc.
Both sides have the incentive to deceive (we might not trade New York for Berlin, but we want others to think we would).
• So why did Containment win?
o Strategy of containment is said to have won the cold war
Why? Nuclear Weapons meant hot war would end world. Also, not a lot of other options than containment.
o Powerful systemic forces pushed toward containment, bipolarity, ideological polarization
o Easy to pursue a policy when the road is essentially laid out before you
o Bipartisan consensus in the US not seen before or since
o Containment is actually many different policies: MAD, Flexible Response, Détente, Regan I and Regan II
PUBLIC OPINION
--Public Opinion requires a belief by the people in the value of a war.
--Public utterly distrusts media because media never reports on what the public is interested in. All horse race, no substance.
--Mass public more worried about economics than security.
--Mass public not as anti-realist as thought, nor as anti-casualty
Ideas reflecting a grand strategy which would be promote the interests of the US
Vision of a Neo-Reaganite Foregin Policy - by Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan
Post Cold-War America faces a challenge - should we return to 'normalcy?' (Pre-world hegemon primacy position) or continue with where we were headed. You know the story - we belong in the limelight.
To retain our edge over everyone else, there are 3 imperatives which should shape foreign policy.
1 - Defense Spending - We must continue to outspend any possible rivals, and have enough to plan for any contingency situation. Because those poor boys in the Pentagon should not have to choose between which type of weapon to buy - they should have both.
2 - Citizen Involvment - civilians should remain loyal and supportive of armed forces, to join them if so required, or just to wave a flag about.
3 - Moral Clarity - we must remember why we are in the world, and what is our purpose - to liberate and democratize the world.
End of the Bush Revolution. Philip Gordon
Turns out being all unilateral and spreading democracy to the dark corners was not the best idea. return to realism
From Preponderence to OffShore Balancing - Christopher Layne
US still needs a grand strategy after cold war, which ended five years ago, and it would be better and more efficient to distance ourselves from the world, disengage just a bit and try to not be in everyone's way, for instance by allocating authority to regional powers who can police areas and check the rise of hostile powers; we just make sure they aren't too strong for their own good, and we keep them from becoming too strong. Our realtionship in Iran-Iraq war was a manifestation of this, as is our relationship with Turkey.
Bismarck or Britain? By Josef Joffe
There are two models for us to follow in the world
Britain- Tongue in the balance of Europe. Only get involved when there is a napoleon or Hitler threatening the balance of power. Other than that, stay off the continent, and try to be as disassociated as possible. Navy is the cornerstone of military force- blockading a good idea. If intervention is neccesary, do it and get out as soon as possible, and do not get intangled in the quagmire. US eary in both world wars is an example.
Bismarckian Germany- recognizing the strategically dangerous position between France and Russia, be the 'Dead weight in the tumbler doll of Europe' from friendships and allies with everyone, to keep them from destroying you, and keep them from fighting each other in a situation where you could be caught up. US handling of Egypt and Israel is an example.
US uses both - but which should be the guiding principle?
Decline of American Soft Power - Joseph Nye
Bush dismissed it, which was probably a bad idea. Rumsfield said he didn't even know what it meant, which wasn't a big surprise. International opinion does, however, play into other nation's willingness to cooperate with us in every way. Their opinion also seeps into every aspect of US, and we can become the target of all accusations (conspiracy theories, great satan, blaming US for poverty, autocracyand destitution). The Attractivenessof the Us, conversely, inspires countries around the world to be our friend.
Great Power Conflict
Defining Great Powers: A Great power is one which is capable of preserving its own independence against any other single power.
Theory
Balance of Power – Neorealist theory; States may choose to “bandwagon” or “balance”. States act in their own self interest to prevent any one power from becoming so great that it is unchallengeable. Predicts conflict when a state (or states) become relatively more powerful, threatening the balance of power.
Hegemonic Stability Theory – Stability of the international system depends on a single dominant power capable of enforcing the rules of the system and possessing the will to enforce those rules. Predicts conflict when no clear hegemon exists.
Power Transition Theory – Most concerned with cyclical nature of war. Dominant state will establish system that most benefits its own interests. Conflict will most likely occur as a challenger is able to rise and match the power of the dominant state (assuming the challenger is dissatisfied with the international system)
Relevant States
India
• Recent success positions India as a world power with the option to play a large role in tipping the scales in favor of the US or against the US. Dissatisfaction with the international system could hurt the stability of the current international system. Accommodation by the US could lead to continued Indian support of the current international system. (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61729/c-raja-mohan/india-and-the-balance-of-power)
Russia
• Though it has obviously fallen from a previous position of relative power equality with the US, Russia must be considered an important part of and integrated into the international system by the current administration. (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65154/robert-legvold/the-russia-file)
China
• China’s rise is of consequence for the US, especially in the economic sector. China has also shown dissatisfaction (or at the very least, little to no interest in completely integrating) with the international system.
• Conflict between Japan and China a concern as the two powers jockey for regional influence and increasingly take steps toward directly counter one another in military and technology areas. (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61515/kent-e-calder/china-and-japans-simmering-rivalry )
- when does enhanced security bring diminishing returns?
o You can keep making the country safer and safer, but each extra security measure costs something, requires people to give up something
o Preventing spread of communism – how much was it worth during the Cold War? Make people free even if it means destroying cities and people?
- Security dilemma – building up armaments to make your self more secure appears as a threat to another country… vicious cycle, more prone to war?
Overused terms – “national interest” and “national security”
- people have conflicting ideas about what is the “national interest”
o some argue Afghanistan is in our national interest, opposite side argue that it is against our national interest to be involved
o important: both sides believe they are doing what is in the best “interest”, but different values are behind each argument
o national interests need to be very specific about common values
Territorial integrity, physical security, economic well being, internal and external democracy
• Territorial integrity not as pressing a concern for US like India and Pakistan
Values are always in flux and are subject to debate over time
- National Security
o Security is about protection of previously acquired values
o Security is never absolute, we can never secure a value 100% against all eventualities
o There are multiple roads to security, each with its own positives and drawbacks
Some argue that acting with the UN is part of national security while others argue that we lose security by sacrificing sovereignty
o Securing our values means giving up some of those values
Value trade offs are inevitable
When you pay money to build more planes, you are taking money you might give back to the citizens or by poured into a government program
o Security conversations do not exists in a vacuum, they touch on every other element of the national conversation
What values are we actually securing when we act in national security?
- Review of Thor Meets Captain America
o Main point: American superheroes were greater than the Norse gods and could have been used to fight, but that was un-American. The Allies would rather have lost than acted like that. Also, the Nazis surrendered all relevance and power to the Norse gods by recruiting them to fight
- Wars of Choice and Wars of Necessity
o Supporters of war declare necessity opponents decry choice
o No such thing as a war of necessity, except insofar as it is necessary to the protection of specific values, but recall that those values are themselves contingent, there are always other options
o A War of Choice may nonetheless be a good idea
A war of necessity is not the only good war
o Discussions about initiating war and about the conduct of war are inherently political
Architecture, Policy and Process
• Architecture of the U.S. national security state is made of a structure of “organs,” each with their own mission
Ex. CIA, NSA, State Department
1947 – a dramatic shift in American policy and architecture after WWII to fit America’s hegemonic role
National Security Act (1947) – restructuring of national security state; Departments of War and Navy merged to create the Department of Defense; also created the CIA and NSC
U.S. policy reoriented to focus on the containment of the Soviet Union
Important Issue: There has been no similar reconstruction of the security institutions since the end of the Cold War. However, the tasks of the organs have changed to combat terrorism and institutions are now working with one another
o Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
Military command was centralized under a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Unified Combatant Commands - brought together the different services, such as the Army and Air Force, to accomplish the tasks needed in a specific area
The newest institution is the Department of Homeland Security (2002) which tries to pull together the bureaucracies to defend the U.S. against terrorism; DNI also created to streamline intelligence (2004)
Security institutions are still looking for someone to confront and contain
In 2000, the Department of Defense was looking for the rise of China to replace the Soviet Union
• Policy and Process:
National Security Council is President’s principle forum on national security – it considers policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies concerning national security
National Security Advisor is responsible to give the President all policy options and oversee interagency operations
Key Departments and Agencies in the National Security Policy Process
Department of State: Leads interagency coordination in developing and implementing foreign policy
Department of Defense: Possible use of military forces and expenditure of DoD resources
Intelligence Community: Provide information for policy-makers to help understand elements and dynamics of various situations
Department of Homeland Security: Protects American interests internally against terrorist threats; ensures polices for HS reflect national security interests
o U.S. National Security Policy is manageable because it has a limited number of players:
State, Defense, Intel, and NSC
• Helpful Reading:
• “National Security Policy Process,” Whittaker, Smith, and McKune
o http://www.virginia.edu/cnsl/pdf/NSC-Report-2007.pdf
• NSC – 68
• The Truman Doctrine
• National Security Policy – Coercion, Force, Deterrence Notes
PRIMACY
Primacy
• Essentially, collective goods are under-provided unless single or small group of actors pick up the slack
• In international politics, even small groups have a hard time getting along, meaning that only one hegemon can provide collective goods (trade regulation, lender of last resort, provision of common currency & security provider)
• In absence of single hegemon, the world suffers economically
American Unipolarity
• US has essentially been hegemonic power since 1945
• 24% of economic production
• Technological primacy, desirable ideology, language and culture
How Does Primacy End?
• Balancing coalition- several collude to displace premier power
• Imperial overstretch
• Uneven growth rates based on economic maturity. Prime state has most mature economy which limits growth
• Voluntary withdrawal
How desirable is primacy?
• It’s freakin’ expensive. Hegemon spends more on defense than everyone else.
• Power remains limited
• Generally speaking, hegemony is desirable. Opens up benefits, allows latitude of action and you can design the system to suit yourself.
The President and Congress
1. The Constitution
- designates President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces with a latitude of decision making power in foreign affairs including management of the State Dept.
- gives Congress the power of the purse, the power to declare war, authorize treaties and some checks on presidential appointments and presidential behavior
- leaves much up for interpretation and tradition
2. Actual Congressional Power
• much congressional power is informal and dependent on the personal interests of particular individuals
• the Executive makes foreign policy in collusion with Congress through different avenues of collaboration
• congressional oversight tends to limit the power of the Executive through formal investigations and the needs of informal deal-making
• the power of the purse is used rarely and is complicated
• no war has been declared since WWII despite multiple conflicts since then
3. Vietnam and the War Powers Act
• after Korea, Vietnam and Watergate it was perceived that the Executive had overstepped its authority
• War Powers Act of 1973 was designated to limit the ability of the President to carry forward undeclared wars and to provide for additional congressional oversight
• War Powers Act has generally been rejected by the Executive as unconstitutional; courts have been silent, but favor the Executive on foreign policy questions
4. Cheney and Executive Power
• after 9/11, Congress authorized military action against the Taliban and terrorism generally
• the authorization was interpreted by many within the Bush administration as a blanket authorization for virtually any foreign policy activity the President sees fit to execute
• it has been argued, the President has the authority to renounce or reinterpret any treaty, to interpret habeas corpus requirements as narrowly as necessary and to define terms like “torture” and “unlawful combatant” beyond the constraint of Congress
• the return to divided government in 2007 brought additional scrutiny on the executive branch activities, but no transformation
DETERRENCE ETC.
• Deterrence Theory
o Developed from game theory in the 50’s.
o Threat of nuclear war in particular drives concern with deterrence
o Rational choice model
Interest is defined as expected utility, taking into account costs, benefits, likelihood of success, and the value of alternative options; this means that a state expecting to lose can still initiate a war (Ex: Japan 1941 – downside of not going to war was too costly).
o In order to deter an opponent, you must convince the opponent that you can increase his costs such that aggression will have no benefit; states only go to war when it is in their interests
o A deterrent posture involves both capabilities (ability to inflict costs) and resolve (willingness to pay the price of inflicting costs)
o Extended deterrence: Bringing the umbrella of deterrence over a friendly state; inherently less credible than normal deterrence (ex. We will stand beside Israel)
o Can apply to both conventional and nuclear war
• How is War Rational at All?
o Why do wars happen between rational actors? Why aren’t negotiated settlements available?
o First, states have an incentive to misrepresent their capabilities – secret capabilities increase the chance of victory in war
o Second, under anarchy, some commitment can’t be firmly held; agreements are not binding and there is no central arbiter
o Third, some goods may be indivisible (two states cannot rule Jerusalem simultaneously)
o Note that this is simply a theoretical exercise, assuming that states are unitary rational actors
o Implications: What does it tell us when one state is flaunting its capabilities? What does it tell us when a state conceals its capabilities?
Think about Saddam’s incentive to claim he had chemical weapons so he could win his war with Iran – US believed him.
Fear the states that conceal – they don’t want you to know what they have - expectation of conflict is high
• Security Dilemma
o We can try to avoid war by increasing our capabilities and thus deterring potential opponents
o However, by increasing our security, we decrease the security of others
o The seizure of strategic territories of the building of armaments that serve to protect us, threaten others
o Even purely “defensive” measures such as walls or missile shields can be turned on an enemy and thus threaten her security
o Status quo states become suspicious of one another, and can become involved in hostility spirals that result in arms races or even war
Example: construction of German High Seas Fleet (to defend against a possible British attack if we take France and Russia)
Example: The construction of the Wall of Athens
Example: The construction of a missile defense shield.
• Critiques of Deterrence Theory
o Psychological – assumes rational actors, value own survival, suffer motivated bias (believing that what we want to be true is actually true), and confirmation bias (new information is interpreted as confirming preexisting beliefs). Difficulties in assessing will and resolve. In times of crisis, there are cognitive roadblocks that may prevent rational action.
o Bureaucratic – bureaucracies survive by regularizing procedure, In crisis, orgs. act procedurally rather than rationally. Also, bureaucracies have different interests than states as a whole.
o Values – deterrence theory assumes that states share a set of basic value understandings (survival, maximization of power, etc) which may in fact be alien to particular value systems
• Terrorism
o Conventional international relations theory is not well equipped for the problem of terrorism. The rational unitary actor assumption generally applies to states
o New security dilemma: as states attempt to create order through traditional means, they succeed in creating more disorder
o Recognition of the contingency of the nation-state; one actor among many
o Emphasis on how deterrence works against non-governmental organizations
o Deterrence theory can still apply; such organizations continue to have values, and values can be threatened.
IE don’t blow yourself up in Israel or we’ll bulldoze your house/family and your neighbor’s house/family
Making terrorism harder can be a deterrent – sure they’re willing to die, but maybe not die for nothing (if we put up a fence they can’t get over)
They have costs, and the costs can be raised. They have values, and their values can be threatened.
• Selected quotes from Thomas Schelling’s Arms and Influence
o “With enough military force a country may not need to bargain. Some things a country wants it can take, and some things it has it can keep, by sheer strength, skill and ingenuity.” – 1
o “…brute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve. It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply.” – 3
o “It is when his pain gives us little or no satisfaction compared with what he can do for us, and the action or inaction that satisfies us costs him less than the pain we can cause, that there is room for coercion.” – 4
o “To hunt down the Comanches and to exterminate them was brute force; to raid their villages to make them behave was coercive diplomacy, based on the power to hurt.” – 5
o “And one of his associates said, ‘Sherman is perfectly right… The only possible way to end this unhappy and dreadful conflict… is to make it terrible beyond endurance.’” – 15
o “The political target of the bomb was not the dead of Hiroshima or the factories they worked in, but the survivors in Tokyo. The two bombs were in the tradition of Sheridan against the Comanches and Sherman in Georgia.” – 17
o “Against defenseless people there is not much that nuclear weapons can do that cannot be done with an ice pick.” – 19
o “This is a difference between nuclear weapons and bayonets. It is not in the number of people they can eventually kill, but in the speed with which it can be done, in the centralization of decision, in the divorce of the war from political processes, and in computerized programs that threaten to take the war out of human hands once it begins.” – 20
o “At law there is a doctrine of the ‘last clear chance.’ It recognizes that, in the events leading up to an accident, there was some point prior to which either party could avert collision, some point after which neither could, and very likely a period between when one party could still control events but the other was helpless to turn aside or stop.” – 44
o (Quoting Sun Tzu – “When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.” 45, notes)
• Compellence (vs. Deterrence)
o An action intended to convince some adversary to take an action, rather than desist from some action.
Coercion – action intended to hurt until the enemy gives up
To hurt, we must know what the enemy values
Compellent power comes from what we haven’t destroyed and our capability to destroy it – not what we have destroyed.
Almost all violence we see in the world is coercion, not brute force.
The last thing you want is a country that has nothing left to lose
• Credibility
o Must make others believe our threats and promises
o Automatic mechanisms – tripwires and alliances are designed to convey commitment
o Bringing the crazy: indicating to the other side that you will pay costs beyond the rational to get what you want
o Interdependence of commitment: An indication of low resolve in one situation indicates low resolve in others situations, thus damaging your credibility – injured reputation for resolve everywhere -
o Bargaining reputation: something worth fighting for? Go to war to maintain reputation? Some people think so.
o Rationality – destroying the world is automatically irrational, so Mutually Assured Destruction is irrational.
• Sending Messages
o Must speak the same language as our opponent – must be able to understand our message
o So use of violence is subject to the same difficulties as the use of diplomacy
o Incentive to deceive – bluffing versus credible commitment, etc.
Both sides have the incentive to deceive (we might not trade New York for Berlin, but we want others to think we would).
• So why did Containment win?
o Strategy of containment is said to have won the cold war
Why? Nuclear Weapons meant hot war would end world. Also, not a lot of other options than containment.
o Powerful systemic forces pushed toward containment, bipolarity, ideological polarization
o Easy to pursue a policy when the road is essentially laid out before you
o Bipartisan consensus in the US not seen before or since
o Containment is actually many different policies: MAD, Flexible Response, Détente, Regan I and Regan II
PUBLIC OPINION
--Public Opinion requires a belief by the people in the value of a war.
--Public utterly distrusts media because media never reports on what the public is interested in. All horse race, no substance.
--Mass public more worried about economics than security.
--Mass public not as anti-realist as thought, nor as anti-casualty
Ideas reflecting a grand strategy which would be promote the interests of the US
Vision of a Neo-Reaganite Foregin Policy - by Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan
Post Cold-War America faces a challenge - should we return to 'normalcy?' (Pre-world hegemon primacy position) or continue with where we were headed. You know the story - we belong in the limelight.
To retain our edge over everyone else, there are 3 imperatives which should shape foreign policy.
1 - Defense Spending - We must continue to outspend any possible rivals, and have enough to plan for any contingency situation. Because those poor boys in the Pentagon should not have to choose between which type of weapon to buy - they should have both.
2 - Citizen Involvment - civilians should remain loyal and supportive of armed forces, to join them if so required, or just to wave a flag about.
3 - Moral Clarity - we must remember why we are in the world, and what is our purpose - to liberate and democratize the world.
End of the Bush Revolution. Philip Gordon
Turns out being all unilateral and spreading democracy to the dark corners was not the best idea. return to realism
From Preponderence to OffShore Balancing - Christopher Layne
US still needs a grand strategy after cold war, which ended five years ago, and it would be better and more efficient to distance ourselves from the world, disengage just a bit and try to not be in everyone's way, for instance by allocating authority to regional powers who can police areas and check the rise of hostile powers; we just make sure they aren't too strong for their own good, and we keep them from becoming too strong. Our realtionship in Iran-Iraq war was a manifestation of this, as is our relationship with Turkey.
Bismarck or Britain? By Josef Joffe
There are two models for us to follow in the world
Britain- Tongue in the balance of Europe. Only get involved when there is a napoleon or Hitler threatening the balance of power. Other than that, stay off the continent, and try to be as disassociated as possible. Navy is the cornerstone of military force- blockading a good idea. If intervention is neccesary, do it and get out as soon as possible, and do not get intangled in the quagmire. US eary in both world wars is an example.
Bismarckian Germany- recognizing the strategically dangerous position between France and Russia, be the 'Dead weight in the tumbler doll of Europe' from friendships and allies with everyone, to keep them from destroying you, and keep them from fighting each other in a situation where you could be caught up. US handling of Egypt and Israel is an example.
US uses both - but which should be the guiding principle?
Decline of American Soft Power - Joseph Nye
Bush dismissed it, which was probably a bad idea. Rumsfield said he didn't even know what it meant, which wasn't a big surprise. International opinion does, however, play into other nation's willingness to cooperate with us in every way. Their opinion also seeps into every aspect of US, and we can become the target of all accusations (conspiracy theories, great satan, blaming US for poverty, autocracyand destitution). The Attractivenessof the Us, conversely, inspires countries around the world to be our friend.
Great Power Conflict
Defining Great Powers: A Great power is one which is capable of preserving its own independence against any other single power.
Theory
Balance of Power – Neorealist theory; States may choose to “bandwagon” or “balance”. States act in their own self interest to prevent any one power from becoming so great that it is unchallengeable. Predicts conflict when a state (or states) become relatively more powerful, threatening the balance of power.
Hegemonic Stability Theory – Stability of the international system depends on a single dominant power capable of enforcing the rules of the system and possessing the will to enforce those rules. Predicts conflict when no clear hegemon exists.
Power Transition Theory – Most concerned with cyclical nature of war. Dominant state will establish system that most benefits its own interests. Conflict will most likely occur as a challenger is able to rise and match the power of the dominant state (assuming the challenger is dissatisfied with the international system)
Relevant States
India
• Recent success positions India as a world power with the option to play a large role in tipping the scales in favor of the US or against the US. Dissatisfaction with the international system could hurt the stability of the current international system. Accommodation by the US could lead to continued Indian support of the current international system. (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61729/c-raja-mohan/india-and-the-balance-of-power)
Russia
• Though it has obviously fallen from a previous position of relative power equality with the US, Russia must be considered an important part of and integrated into the international system by the current administration. (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65154/robert-legvold/the-russia-file)
China
• China’s rise is of consequence for the US, especially in the economic sector. China has also shown dissatisfaction (or at the very least, little to no interest in completely integrating) with the international system.
• Conflict between Japan and China a concern as the two powers jockey for regional influence and increasingly take steps toward directly counter one another in military and technology areas. (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61515/kent-e-calder/china-and-japans-simmering-rivalry )
Sunday, October 11, 2009
South Ossetia EU Report
As discussed, link to the EU Report on South Ossetia from the 2008 war.
Reflection by Dr. Farley on Lawyers, Guns, and Money .
Reflection by Dr. Farley on Lawyers, Guns, and Money .
Friday, October 9, 2009
Simplifing Document Sharing
I'm making an online compilation of useful study documents. If you have something like a book review, we can post it there. I'll also try to post any docs sent over listserve.
http://www.uky.edu/~pmmu222/comps/
http://www.uky.edu/~pmmu222/comps/
Drezner on Iran Talks
Courtesy of David Evans, an concise looks at Iran talks/concessions from various perspectives. (Sorry it's not hyperlinked, the comp I'm using won't let me - I dunno why.)
http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/02/an_ideology_friendly_guide_to_the_iran_negotiations
Also, the Drezner blog at Foreign Policy is pretty good. And we all know how much Hillebrand like Drezner.
EP
http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/02/an_ideology_friendly_guide_to_the_iran_negotiations
Also, the Drezner blog at Foreign Policy is pretty good. And we all know how much Hillebrand like Drezner.
EP
Wednesday, October 7, 2009
Potentially useful links
"Rulers" is a website that does a pretty good job of listing the leaders of all countries from 1700ish. Why it's useful: Go into your oral comps confident that you know the leader of at least five African countries.
http://rulers.org/
"Nation Master" is my favorite site for economic comparison. You can view the information by almost any category combination where it's available.
Why it's useful: Know the rank of world economies, throw some statistics behind your writing.
http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php
"World Maps" has all kinds of games to help you learn geography, countries, and capitals. I suggest it before the FSOT as well.
Why it's useful: Stempel apparently likes to ask a random capital during oral comps.
http://www.sheppardsoftware.com/Geography.htm
The IR Theory Knowledge Base provides theory overviews in a concise, easy to read format.
Why it's useful: At least two of these terms will be on the written test. Probably more.
http://www.irtheory.com/know.htm
The Little Prince written and illustrated by Antoine de Saint Exupéry
Why it's useful: Keeps life in perspective. There will be life after our comprehensive exams.
http://www.angelfire.com/hi/littleprince/frames.html
http://rulers.org/
"Nation Master" is my favorite site for economic comparison. You can view the information by almost any category combination where it's available.
Why it's useful: Know the rank of world economies, throw some statistics behind your writing.
http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php
"World Maps" has all kinds of games to help you learn geography, countries, and capitals. I suggest it before the FSOT as well.
Why it's useful: Stempel apparently likes to ask a random capital during oral comps.
http://www.sheppardsoftware.com/Geography.htm
The IR Theory Knowledge Base provides theory overviews in a concise, easy to read format.
Why it's useful: At least two of these terms will be on the written test. Probably more.
http://www.irtheory.com/know.htm
The Little Prince written and illustrated by Antoine de Saint Exupéry
Why it's useful: Keeps life in perspective. There will be life after our comprehensive exams.
http://www.angelfire.com/hi/littleprince/frames.html
Sunday, October 4, 2009
Sunday study sessions
4:00p Intelligence
4:15-5p Development
5:00p Commerce (in the Fine Arts Library)
6:00p Security
7:00p Diplomacy
4:15-5p Development
5:00p Commerce (in the Fine Arts Library)
6:00p Security
7:00p Diplomacy
Development Meeting Schedule
September 27th--International Relations Theory for International Organizations and Development
October 4th--Neoclassical Growth Model, Neo-Malthusianism, liberal economic theory
October 11th--International Organizations and Regimes
October 25th--New Institutional Economics, Principal-Agent Theory, Poverty Measurements
November 1st--Africa's Development Challenges
November 8th--the Bretton Woods system
November 15th--Critiques of Development (Dependency Theory, Marxism & Neo-Marxism, Structuralism, Value Chain Analysis)
November 22nd--Current Events in Development
October 4th--Neoclassical Growth Model, Neo-Malthusianism, liberal economic theory
October 11th--International Organizations and Regimes
October 25th--New Institutional Economics, Principal-Agent Theory, Poverty Measurements
November 1st--Africa's Development Challenges
November 8th--the Bretton Woods system
November 15th--Critiques of Development (Dependency Theory, Marxism & Neo-Marxism, Structuralism, Value Chain Analysis)
November 22nd--Current Events in Development
Diplomacy Schedule
This is our tentative schedule for the next two months. Feel free to sit in on any session.
10.11: Russia; History/Structure/Diplomatic Culture (Erin & Trish)
10.18: Israel/Palestine; Negotiations/ Culture (Angie & Jessica)
10.25: China (Asia); Theories/Groupthink/Game Theory/ Realism/Liberalism (Scott)
11.1: Africa; Crisis Negotiation/Conflict Resolution (Lance)
11.8: Latin America; Government/Types of Governance/Politics/Communication (Patrick)
11.15: Middle East (MEI Conferences); Public Diplomacy/Intelligence (Jennifer)
11.22: Non-governmental actors; Current events (Sean)
11.29: Iran; Pizza/Professional Module/Test Questions (Erin &Trish)
10.11: Russia; History/Structure/Diplomatic Culture (Erin & Trish)
10.18: Israel/Palestine; Negotiations/ Culture (Angie & Jessica)
10.25: China (Asia); Theories/Groupthink/Game Theory/ Realism/Liberalism (Scott)
11.1: Africa; Crisis Negotiation/Conflict Resolution (Lance)
11.8: Latin America; Government/Types of Governance/Politics/Communication (Patrick)
11.15: Middle East (MEI Conferences); Public Diplomacy/Intelligence (Jennifer)
11.22: Non-governmental actors; Current events (Sean)
11.29: Iran; Pizza/Professional Module/Test Questions (Erin &Trish)
A summary of comps studies
This is a forum for all the different majors to combine knowledge. Feel free to upload notes, book reviews, study schedules or any other pertinent information. Current events, ongoing issues and related articles are also fair game. If there is a better/preferred email that you wish to blog from, let me know @ pmurphy1014@gmail.com
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)